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Abstract
A good knowledge representation system has to ﬁnd a balance between expressive power on the
one hand and eﬃcient reasoning on the other. Furthermore it is necessary to understand its
limitations and problems. A logic which contains strings is very expressive and allows for very
natural representations, which in turn allow for appropriate reasoning patterns. However, such a
system has the feature that it is possible to formulate self-referential paradoxes in it. This can be
considered as a strength and as a weakness at the same time. On the one hand it is a positive
aspect that it is possible to represent paradoxes, which can be formulated in natural language. On
the other hand it is necessary to be careful and not to trivialise the logical system. In the paper
diﬀerent aspects of knowledge representation which allows self-referentiality will be discussed. A
system will be presented which is a pragmatic compromise between expressive power on the one
hand and simplicity and eﬃciency of the reasoning process on the other hand. It is built on a
three-valued system that makes it possible to use reasoning techniques from classical ﬁrst-order
logic.
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1 Introduction
Logical paradoxes have been known at least back to the Cretan prophet Epi-
menides who said “All Cretans are liars.” Under some additional assumptions
this leads to a paradoxical situation. In its most concise form, the paradox
can be formulated by the sentence: “This sentence is false.” Let’s assume it
is true, then it must be false, since it says that it is false. Hence it must be
false. This leads to a contradiction as well, since if it is false, its content can’t
be true, hence the sentence can’t be false either.
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The problems with paradoxical sentences have been known for very long,
but were initially thought to be of no relevance for the development of set
theory and logic around the end of the 19th/start of the 20th century. But
then paradoxes in set theory and logic seemed to endanger the progress in the
ﬁeld and for a while it wasn’t clear whether “the paradise of sets” built by
Cantor (as Hilbert called it) and “the paradise of logic” built by Frege weren’t
inhabited by terrible lions that could attack and kill at any time. Zermelo
presented in [20] the ﬁrst axiomatisation of set theory, and Russell [16] in the
same year the theory of types. This way it was (apparently) possible to fence
the lions out.
While to a certain extend the constructs of axiomatic sets and types may be
considered as adequate for mathematical reasoning, there are quite a number
of examples in the areas of language understanding and knowledge representa-
tion in a more general sense, where we need a more powerful language, where
we can’t and/or do not want to exclude self-referentiality a priori on mere syn-
tactic grounds. If we did, we would end up with a system which is diﬃcult to
use. Actually quite a number of complicated formalisms have been developed
and are currently in the main stream of investigations in AI, although some
simpler system may do the job better. Perlis argued in [14] that we “can have
everything in ﬁrst-order logic.” He investigated a system which is close to the
one we propose here, it’s ﬁrst-order logic plus strings.
Our system will be made more formal in the next section. In section 3 we
make it clear what we mean by a paradox. Section 4 is devoted to three-valued
Kleene logic, the system that will be used to deal with paradoxes. Section 5
describes an eﬃcient form of reasoning for the three-valued approach. Some
related work is presented in section 6. Finally a summary is given.
2 Syntactic Theory
Before we introduce a formal syntax for syntactic theory we introduce some
examples of expressions we want to be able to formulate. Then we ﬁx a syntax,
and discuss problems.
Let us look now at some typical examples of pieces of knowledge that can
be represented and reasoned with in syntactic theory:
(i) John knows that the morning star is the evening star.
K(John, “evening star = morning star”)
(ii) This sentence is false. L :≡ ¬True(“L”)
(iii) If this proposition is true, then A. Lo¨b :≡ (True(“Lo¨b”) → A)
The relationship between modal logic and syntactic theory corresponds to indi-
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rect vs. direct speech. Davis stresses that direct speech is more powerful, since
in particular non-syntactic expressions can be expressed directly, e.g., (“John
said ‘Arglebargle glumph’ ”, formally said(John, “Arglebargle glumph”), but
not indirectly. A similar property holds for modal logic versus syntactic the-
ory. Konolige [11, p.114] mentions two main advantages of syntactic theory
over hierarchical approaches to knowledge representation, ﬁrstly “a lessening
of the notational burden associated with hierarchical languages” and “that
self-referential languages are more expressive than hierarchical languages, and
this diﬀerence might be important in representing belief.”
In this contribution, we shall see in more detail, a three-valued approach
to deal with paradoxes; formulae like the liar sentence are admitted, but they
are neither true nor false, but paradoxical. In order to do so, a third truth
value, nn (standing for “neither-nor”) is added. As we shall see, just adding
such a truth value does not solve the problem, but the system has to fulﬁl an
additional constraint. However, before we go into a semantic analysis, let’s
ﬁrst ﬁx the syntax and then clarify what we mean by a paradox.
The language we want to investigate is a standard ﬁrst-order sorted lan-
guage plus strings as terms. In addition to the standard setting, we use strings
in the language. To this end we take characters as constant symbols in the
language. Following the description in [3] we preﬁx characters by a colon, e.g.,
:C is the character C, :∧ the character standing for the conjunction connec-
tive. Furthermore we assume a binary function symbol, pair, on strings, which
takes a character and a string as input. From the empty string ε we build
up all strings, e.g., pair(:C, pair(:a, pair(:t, ε))). Since these expressions play a
major role, we introduce as syntactic sugar for expressions like the one above
the notation “Cat”.
It is possible to deﬁne and use syntactic predicate symbols. Variable(“x”)
and Objconstant(“John”) denote, for instance, that x and John are a variable
and an object constant, respectively. Details of such a construction can be
found in [5, Chapter 10]. Sorts stand for unary predicates. That is, a term t
is of sort S (written as t<−S) iﬀ S(t). Sorted quantiﬁcation like ∀xS A seman-
tically means that the x’s are not taken from the whole universe of discourse,
but only from the subset of those elements which are in the interpretation of
S. The sort system adopted here has been introduced by Weidenbach [19].
The so-deﬁned language is reﬂective. For instance, it is possible to deﬁne
the syntax of the language within the language. Although it is intended that
strings and objects they stand for are closely related, we must carefully dis-
tinguish between them. There is an intuitive diﬀerence between long(John)
and long(“John”) where long is a polymorphic predicate symbol that is true
for persons over 195cm and strings consisting of at least eight characters.
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In addition to the syntactic function and predicate symbols there are se-
mantic predicate symbols such as True. We shall discuss in particular this
predicate symbol in detail in the sequel. For this special predicate symbol we
will also have to give a special semantic account (as one does for ﬁrst-order
logic plus equality, where the equality sign gets a ﬁxed interpretation).
Traditionally at this point the semantics of the language is discussed. In
our case this is not so straightforward and the meaning of syntactic theory is
one of the major problems with this language. Hence we shall ﬁrst try to get
an intuitive idea of the semantics, then we discuss in more detail how such a
system can be build up.
3 Paradoxes
The existence of problematic expressions in syntactic theory has been known
back to the start of the 20th century. If we assume a standard ﬁrst-order
semantics there is no problem with the liar sentence, since the strings like “L”
and “A” are ordinary ground terms in the language and have nothing to do
with their counterparts L and A. However, as such they are not particularly
meaningful and do not capture the intended meaning. Of course we like the
predicate True to mean truth. Tarski [17] gave a famous deﬁnition of truth:
True(“A”) ≡ A
as axiom schema for arbitrary formulae A. If we add this schema the liar
example is turned into a paradox, since we get: L ≡ ¬True(“L”) ≡ ¬L.
The last example, sentence, Lo¨b, is not a paradox in a strict sense, but
an example that violates the conservativity of deﬁnitions. It can be stated
as “If this proposition is true, then A.” where A is an arbitrary formula.
Formally we get Lo¨b :≡ True(“Lo¨b”) → A. With the deﬁnition of truth this
simpliﬁes to Lo¨b ≡ (Lo¨b → A). This formula is problematic in a two-valued
setting since it allows to prove A for arbitrary A. The only consistent way
to assign truth values is one, in which A must be true. That is, deﬁning Lo¨b
potentially changes the semantic status of sentences.
Of course it is possible to doubt whether these examples are relevant and do
really occur; also whether there is a syntactic way to exclude them. Kripke [12]
stated the so-called Watergate Paradox by summarising diﬀerent propositions
made by a journalist Jones and by the former US president Nixon about
the Watergate aﬀair. Nixon says “Everything Jones says about Watergate is
true.” and Jones says “Most of Nixon’s assertions about Watergate are false.”
If we assume in addition that Nixon made 2n+ 1 assertions about Watergate
altogether of which n are deﬁnitively true, n deﬁnitively false, plus the one
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above, we have reproduced the paradox of the liar.
This example suggests that it is not possible to decide just on syntactic
grounds whether sentences make up a paradox or not, since this may depend on
the real world context. If Nixon, for instance, always told the truth except for
the statement about Jones, there wouldn’t be a paradox, the two statements
would simply be false. There seems not to be a clearcut syntactic borderline
of what should be admissible and what not.
We will understand by a paradox, a deﬁnition which cannot be evaluated to
the truth value true. A deﬁnition is a sentence which introduces a new concept,
that is, a constant symbol, function symbol, or predicate symbol, which has
not been in the signature. A property we usually expect from a deﬁnition is
that it forms a conservative extension, that is, that the semantic status of old
concepts remains unchanged by the introduction of the new concept.
4 Kleene Logic for Syntactic Theory
In this section three-valued Kleene logic [10] is extended in order to deal with
syntactic expressions. As we shall see this allows us to treat the liar sentence
adequately, but cannot be yet quite the ﬁnal system, since not all problems
with paradoxes can be avoided that way. The treatment in the following
corresponds roughly to the development of the mechanisation of Kleene logic
developed by Kerber and Kohlhase [8,9]. In the ﬁrst of these contributions
a tableau calculus for sorted three-valued Kleene logic is described, in the
second a way is shown how to extend a classical two-valued theorem prover by
a simple restriction strategy in a way that it can be used as a theorem prover
for an interesting fragment of Kleene logic. I give here only a short summary
of the results, for details see the corresponding papers.
In addition to the treatment of Kleene logic in the papers mentioned above,
in the following we have to deal with strings (a simple conservative extension as
discussed above) and additionally the axiom schema for deﬁning the semantics
of the True predicate.
4.1 Syntax and Semantics
As above we assume terms to be variables (labelled by a sort), constant sym-
bols, or functional expressions. In particular strings are terms. Atomic formu-
lae are either k-ary predicate symbols applied to k terms or sort expressions of
the form t<−S. Formulae in general are built by the connectives and quantiﬁers
as ¬A, DA, A ∨ B, A ≡ B, ∀xS A.
The semantics is based on three truth values, false, nn, and true. The
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meaning of the connectives can be deﬁned by the truth tables
¬
false true
nn nn
true false
D
false true
nn false
true true
∧ false nn true
false false false false
nn false nn nn
true false nn true
≡ is true if and only if the input truth values are the same and false else.
Other connectives ∨, →, and ↔ can be deﬁned in ∧ and ¬ just as in classical
two-valued logic. The semantics of the universal quantiﬁer is deﬁned by
Iϕ(∀xS A) := ∀˜({Iϕ,[a/x](A) | a ∈ AS})
∀˜(T ) :=
⎧⎨
⎩
true for T = {true} or T = ∅
nn for T = {true, nn} or T = {nn}
false for false ∈ T
The semantics of the True predicate is deﬁned as
I(True(x)) =
{I(A) if x = “A” and A is a wﬀ
nn else
Remark 4.1 Note that this is (purposefully) not a proper deﬁnition of the
True predicate, since it doesn’t unambiguously ﬁxes the meaning of True. Let
us assume, for instance, a knowledge base Γ := {T,T ≡ True(“T”)}. Noth-
ing can be derived if someone protests his sincerity. The sentence has three
ﬁxpoints, false, nn, and true. In the semantics we ﬁx the meaning of True just
to the extent that it mirrors Tarski’s deﬁnition of truth and build a calculus
which exactly corresponds to this. If we assume this semantics it is possible to
consistently assign truth values to the liar sentence, namely with I(L) = nn
the whole equivalence is true (and hence not causing any trouble).
4.2 Calculus and Properties
In the following a refutation tableau calculus for three-valued Kleene logic is
presented, the details can be found in [8]. Let A be a formula, then Aα is a
labelled formula if ∅ 	= α ⊆ {false, nn, true}.
In order to show that a formula B follows from a formula set {A1, . . . ,An}
we can prove that the set of labelled formulae {Atrue1 , . . . ,Atruen ,Bnn,false} is
unsatisﬁable. 1 That is, it is shown that the assumption that the Ai hold and
B is nn or false is inconsistent (“quartum non datur”-principle).
1 The formulae in the formula set are implicitly conjuncts. Formulae like Bnn,false stand for
B is nn or B is false.
M. Kerber / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 123 (2005) 151–163156
Tableau Rules: Tableau rules for ∧ and ∀ are:
(A ∧B)true
Atrue
Btrue
(A ∧B)nn
Ann,true
Bnn,true
Ann | Bnn
(A ∧B)false
Afalse | Bfalse
(∀xS A)true
[yS/xS]A
true
(∀xS A)nn
[f(y1, . . . , yn)/xS]A
nn
[yS/xS]A
nn,true
(f(y1, . . . , yn)<−S)true
(∀xS A)false
[f(y1, . . . , yn)/xS]A
false
(f(y1, . . . , yn)<−S)true
Now we only need tableau closure rules: These are a cut rule, which allows
to close a tableau which contains formulae with complementary labels and the
strict rule which allows to close a tableau if a deﬁned expression contains an
undeﬁned term. Where possible we would like to make use of most general
uniﬁers, of course. In the case of string expressions, these may not be so easy
to compute, however, and a uniﬁcation algorithm would have to make use of
techniques developed in higher-order uniﬁcation. In both cases so-called sort
constraints insure the correctness (in terms of the sorts) of the instantiations.
We quote the soundness and completeness theorem from [8]:
Theorem 4.2 (Soundness and Completeness)
The tableau calculus is sound and complete for Kleene logic.
Remark 4.3 In order to ensure soundness and completeness for the syntactic
theory add axioms that exactly capture the meaning of the semantic predi-
cates, i.e., in the case of True add True(“A”) ≡ A either as axiom schema or
as simpliﬁcation rules (plus the reverse rules):
(True(“A”))α
Aα
if A wwf
(True(“A”))α
(True(“A”))α∩{nn}
else
4.3 Problems
Now let us take a closer look whether the three-valued system is adequate for
dealing with paradoxes. We have already seen that it is adequate for treating
the liar paradox. But can it do so for all paradoxes?
When we look at the sentence “This sentence is paradoxical or false”, we
can deﬁne it in this system as P :≡ ¬DTrue(“P”) ∨ ¬True(“P”). With the
deﬁnition of truth we can simplify the expression to P ≡ ¬DP ∨ ¬P. If we
look at the possible truth values for P, that is, false, nn, and true, we get an
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evaluation, which shows that P cannot be consistently assigned to any of the
three truth values that are available. That means, while we have tamed some
paradoxes like the liar sentence by assigning a third truth value to them, some
are still wild beasts and cause mayhem in form of contradictions.
Neither the attempt to remedy the problems with paradoxes by many-
valued logics nor the problems of an ad hoc solution by introducing a further
truth value are new. In 1939 Bochvar made such an attempt, but as Church
pointed out the same year, the problems can be easily reconstructed in the
three-valued setting again (see [18, p.75]). Actually, adding more and more
truth values is a solution to the problem, but there is no intuitive meaning of
these values any more.
4.4 How to Avoid Self-Referential Paradoxes
The source of any paradoxes of self-referentiality relies on the fact that it is
possible to deﬁne a formula to which no truth value can be assigned. This
can be done in the propositional logic case if and only if it is possible to
deﬁne a function in the connectives that is ﬁxpoint free on the truth values.
In a two-valued system such a function is easily deﬁned, it is just negation
(λx ¬x), that is, as soon as negation is part of a self-referential two-valued
system, paradoxes are not far away, or to put it the other way around: in
a two-valued logic without negation (explicit or implicit) it is not possible
to construct paradoxes. To give up negation in a knowledge representation
system is, of course, a serious restriction of the expressive power.
In our three-valued setting above λx ¬Dx ∨ ¬x and λx (x ≡ ¬x) ≡ x are
ﬁxpoint-free as well. If we apply one of these functions to any of the three
truth values false, nn, or true, the result will never be the same as the input
of the function. From this the paradoxes are easily constructed.
However, if we restrict the language to a system, in which each function
that can be built from the connectives has at least one ﬁxpoint (conveniently,
nn often plays that role), it is not possible to construct self-referential para-
doxes. This restriction seems not to be a very serious one, since it is rarely
desired to communicate paradoxicality. If one really liked to do so one would
have to go to a four-valued setting (which would have paradoxes of a higher
kind in itself, of course).
In a three-valued setting, no language that contains the connectives ¬,
∨, and D and no language with unrestricted use of ¬ and ≡ guarantees the
existence of ﬁxpoints. But ¬ has nn as ﬁxpoint, λx x∨x has the same ﬁxpoint
nn as well (and in addition the ﬁxpoints false and true), and the ﬁxpoint
property is conserved under composition.
However, this restriction would not prevent the construction of more subtle
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paradoxes, in which we construct paradoxes by deﬁning a binary function f
(using only ¬ and ∨) in the truth values such that x := f(x, y) for a ﬁxed
truth value y. This would cause a problem if x 	= f(x, y) for all possible truth
values x. In that case y can’t be nn, since then x = nn would be a ﬁxpoint.
So let us assume that y 	= nn. Is it possible to deﬁne a function f in ¬ and
∨ such that f(x, y) 	= x for x = true, x = nn, and x = false? This is not
the case, since when restricted to false and true, f has also range {false, true}.
In order to be ﬁxpoint free on {false, true}, f(x, y) must be ¬x, since this is
the only ﬁxpoint free function of all possible 16 such functions. Hence it will
have the ﬁxpoint nn on the full set {false, nn, true}. (Typically there are more
ﬁxpoints than just nn.)
Theorem 4.4 Any function built from the connectives ¬ and ∨ contains a
ﬁxpoint.
The ﬁxpoint property has as corollary that deﬁnitions form conservative
extensions. Let us now have a look why universally quantiﬁed formulae like
A ≡ ∀x B have a ﬁxpoint. This is potentially problematic if x is a string
which allows an instantiation with an expression that contains A. If B can be
made false for one instantiation of x, A is false. If B can be made true for all
instantiations, then A is true. In other cases (it is not possible to instantiate
x to get a false value, but it is not always true), we can select nn as ﬁxpoint.
This possibility is given since the propositional system of connectives is not
complete.
In order to be able to introduce deﬁnitions (like the deﬁnition of the liar
sentence, but of course of more useful sentences as well), the ≡ connective
cannot be abandoned altogether, but has to be allowed in deﬁnitions, that is,
in the form A ≡ . . . or ∀x A(x) ≡ . . ., where A is a predicate constant. This
does not cause problems, since the right hand side will have a ﬁxpoint of A if
A occurs in it, hence the equivalence as such can always be made true.
5 Consequence Relation and Reasoning
When we abandon the D connective, we lose most tautologies in the language
and the question arises how we can restore a non-trivial system when there
are no proper tautologies in it. This is achieved by considering sequents, that
is, pairs consisting of a set of formulae Φ and a formula A (written Φ  A),
in which all formulae in Φ are assumed to be true. The semantic equivalent
is the model relation Φ |= A that stands for: in all models of Φ, that is, all
interpretations that evaluate every formula in Φ to true, A holds as well, that
is, A is evaluated to true as well. A proof theory that is built on the refutation
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principle makes use of the fact that all formulae in Φ must be true and refutes
the assumptions that A might be false or nn. Note the asymmetry between Φ
and A in this approach, formulae in Φ can’t be nn, while A might be.
Since we use a restricted language without a D connective it is possible to
make use of the strategy for reusing two-valued theorem proving methods in
dealing with Kleene logic as described in [9]. That means, eﬃcient standard
two-valued theorem provers can be made to eﬃcient theorem provers for the
approach above just by adding a simple restriction strategy.
This forms a calculus for ﬁrst-order Kleene logic in general. In order to
handle quoted expressions, we have to add axiom schemas that describe the
semantics of the meta-predicates deﬁned on them. In the case of the truth
predicate True, which we have looked at more closely, this means we add the
rules from remark 4.3, or corresponding axiom schemas.
The main result from [9] is that it is possible to use the structural similarity
between the tableau rules for truth value sets containing nn and those not
containing nn. It is possible to just eliminate nn in these rules. Since it
is possible to avoid rules for the truth value nn altogether by using combined
rules (for false, nn and nn, true), it is possible to establish the following strategy
result, which allows to employ standard ﬁrst-order theorem proving techniques
for Kleene logic as well.
Theorem 5.1 (Strategy) Let S be the control strategy not to close a tableau
on two formulae both stemming from the theorem, then each two-valued tableau
proof found using S can be lifted to a three-valued tableau proof for the theorem.
Remark 5.2 The result from [9] leaves us with the question how to treat the
≡ connective eﬃciently. We could use tableau rules for ≡. However, we make
only restricted use of the≡ connective, namely for deﬁnitions (“deﬁniendum ≡
deﬁniens”). For that reason only the ﬁrst of the three tableau rules ((A ≡
B)true) is relevant at all. But even this rule splits the tableau into three
tableaux, hence it would be rather ineﬃcient. Even more seriously, the strat-
egy result mentioned above could not be conserved. Instead of using this rule,
we simply assume that in proofs all deﬁnitions can be expanded, that is, we
take a deﬁnition expansion rule into the calculus (for arbitrary truth value
sets α). Aα
(A ≡ B)true
Bα
This rule (as well as the rule for handling True(“A”) if we assume A to be a
well-formed formula) fulﬁls the conditions of the strategy theorem. Hence the
corresponding theorem carries over to our case as well.
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6 Related Work
There is an abundance of literature on paradoxes, the reasons for their exis-
tence as well as on ways how to deal with them. It would be easy to ﬁll books
just with an overview and it will be impossible to give a fair account here.
The ﬁrst solution to treat paradoxes goes back to Russell and it is as easy
as brilliant, namely simply to exclude them. Russell introduced types such
that in any expression of the form P (Q), P has to have a higher type than Q.
In particular P can’t express anything about itself or about anything that can
make statements about P . This approach has been adapted by Tarski [17] to
hierarchical meta-systems, in which it is possible to speak explicitly about the
truth of statements, but not in the language itself, but in some meta-language.
If one wants to make statements about the meta-language, this is possible as
well, but then one needs a meta-meta-language. This approach has been
formalised and implemented in the multi-level meta-systems FOL and Get-
fol [6]. While this approach is appropriate for mathematics, examples like the
Watergate paradox point to the conclusion that excluding self-referentiality
altogether is not appropriate for (at least) some applications.
An alternative to totally forbidding self-reference is restricting it, putting
it in the right context. This approach is discussed by Barwise and Etchemendy
in detail in [1] as the second approach, which they call the Austinian approach.
The idea is to restrict self-referential expressions in an adequate way. Applied
to Russell’s example of the barber this means, the deﬁnition of the barber as
“the man who shaves all and only the men who don’t shave themselves” is
problematic. But, for instance, to deﬁne the barber as “the man who shaves
all and only the men who live in Oxford and who don’t shave themselves”
means only that the barber does not live in Oxford. While I agree that many
situations which seem to be paradoxical on the ﬁrst view can be clariﬁed so
that the paradox goes away, certain sentences are deliberately paradoxical.
Kripke [12] and others attacked the problem by changing the semantic con-
struction of the truth values of formulae. They go beyond two-valued logic in
a way that they assume a third truth value, which stands for the paradoxical
expressions. There are diﬀerent ways, either to assume truth value gaps [4] or
a third truth value, which states undeﬁnedness explicitly [10, p.332–340]. In
both systems, Tarski’s original deﬁnition of truth can be incorporated, that
is, True(“A”) ≡ A and the liar sentence, L :≡ ¬True(“L”) can be dealt with
as well. In the ﬁrst system with truth value gaps, no truth value is assigned
to the liar sentence L. In the second, L is evaluated to the truth value nn, in
particular True(“L”) is nn as well. The question arises how to determine the
truth values in such expressions. To this end Kripke proposes a ﬁxpoint itera-
tion, a process in which in each iteration truth values are assigned to more and
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more formulae. Kripke’s approach is an appropriate general semantic account.
Such a general approach is necessary for a general approach. It has been made
more formal and in particular it has been given a semantic interpretation by
Barwise and Etchemendy [1]. They use Aczel’s theory of hypersets (sets which
do not fulﬁl the foundation axiom) to model self-referentiality. A more de-
tailed description is given in [2]. A similar approach has been developed in
parallel by McGee [13]. In Perlis’ approach [14] Tarski’s deﬁnition of truth is
changed to a system in which L and ¬True(“L”) hold at the same time.
The approach presented in this paper can be viewed as a restricted version
of what Barwise and Etchemendy call the Russellian approach. It builds up on
earlier work by the author [7], and is closely related to Ramsay’s approach [15],
which is built up on a constructive λ-calculus.
7 Summary
We have seen in this contribution a three-valued approach to allow self-
referential sentences in a formal system almost without any restrictions. The
only restriction that we have to impose on such a system, is to guarantee
that any deﬁnition gives us a ﬁxpoint. For predicative deﬁnitions this can be
guaranteed by deﬁnitions which make use only of the standard connectives,
while excluding connectives which would allow to speak about paradoxicality.
On the ﬁrst view this seems to trivialise the system, since by this restriction
we have eliminated almost all tautologies from the system. However, when
we assume a background theory, with respect to which reasoning takes place,
this is not a serious restriction at all. All formulae in the background theory
are assumed to be true (this is equivalent to saying, they are not false and not
paradoxical). If we assume a paradoxical formula in the background theory as
true, the system becomes inconsistent (and not paradoxical), just as a classical
system becomes inconsistent by assuming a formula and its negation. Interest-
ingly the restriction on the connectives allows to transfer standard two-valued
theorem proving techniques to the three-valued case.
Summarising, we have presented a system for stating facts about truth. By
adding further axiom schemas it is possible to extend the framework to deal
with knowledge and belief as well. No unnatural restrictions on the expressive
power are made in order to avoid self-referential statements. As shown in
section 5 standard calculi can be used. In this work we have not produced
a formal ﬁxpoint construction for the True predicate, but only given an in-
dication why such ﬁxpoints exist. Building on the work of Kripke, Barwise,
Etchemendy, and Moss this should be possible, but is left as future work.
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